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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE &
DEVELOPMENT: THE STATE OF PLAY
Daniel J. Gervais*
For too long IPRs have been regarded as food for the rich countries and
poison for poor countries .... [I]t is not as simple as that. Poor countries
may find them useful provided they are accommodated to suit local
palates.'
INTRODUCTION
The question one is tempted to ask Justice Laddie is: But exactly how
can intellectual property rights ("IPRs") be accommodated to suit local
palates? In its 2002 Report 2 the Commission, set up by the U.K.
Government and chaired by Professor John Barton of Stanford Law School,
suggested several ways in which international intellectual property ("IP")
could be amended to better fit the needs of developing countries. I will
review those and other recommendations and discuss the ways in which IP
norms can be adapted to address the needs of developing nations.
The focus of Part I will be to understand the economic, social, and
cultural forces at play. Economics will provide the first set of analytical
tools. The reason is self-evident. When U.S. and other Western lobbies
successfully arranged the marriage of IP and trade rules,3 it became
inevitable that IP rules would be measured using an economic yardstick.
After all, trade liberalization is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a means to
an end, the promotion of economic growth. While they may interface with
those rights and standards, trade rules do not protect either environmental or
labor standards, nor do they protect human rights as part of their core
mission. Thus, by setting the IP table in the house of trade, the cloak of IP
* Ph.D., Vice-Dean of Research, and Oslers Professor of Intellectual Property and
Technology Law, Faculty of Law (Common Law), University of Ottawa; Former Head of
Section, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); and Legal Officer, GATTIWTO.
Financial assistance from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
(SSHRC) and research assistance from Shalisa Khan (LL.B., University of Ottawa) and
Marina Pavolvic (LL.D. candidate, University of Ottawa) are gratefully acknowledged.
1. Sir Hugh Laddie, Forward to Comm'n on Intell. Prop. Rights, Integrating
Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy (2002), available at
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final-report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf [hereinafter U.K.
IPR Commission Report].
2. Id.
3. See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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as a simple variation on the classic theme of property 4 or even as a human
right-notions essentially developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth
century 5-was bound to fall.
The linkage between IP and trade also points to a different method of
making policy analysis and recommendations. The raw public choice
approach, where lobbies representing the most interested parties are locked
in the same room, was used in a number of previous domestic IP
lawmaking efforts. 6 If one concedes that making a proper policy analysis is
impossible or inherently unreliable because theoretical models are
inadequate or valid empirical data is unavailable, then perhaps that is the
only rational way to proceed. I am not yet prepared to throw in the policy
towel, however, and neither did the U.K. Commission on Intellectual
Property Rights ("U.K. IPR Commission").7 As Professor John H. Barton
noted in the preface, "We decided early on not just to attempt to suggest
compromises among different interest groups, but to be as evidence-based
as possible."
Against this backdrop, this Article first examines the emergence of the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"). 9 TRIPS was negotiated as part
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. TRIPS was an
effort both to increase (for most WTO members) the level of IP protection
and reduce differences among national rules. TRIPS added a significant
level of comfort for multinational corporations deciding when and where to
export to new markets or expand research and development efforts ' 0 -some
of the more important factors those corporations tend to consider include
the tax structure and available subsidies, the availability of qualified
workers and the labor relations environment, the protection of investments,
the quality of the legal and judicial systems, and law enforcement."I This
4. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Political Economy of
Intellectual Property Law (2004).
5. See generally Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (1991).
6. See Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 16-22; see also Sheldon W. Halpern, The Art
of Compromise and Compromising Art: Copyright, Technology, and the Arts, 50 J.
Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 273, 310 (2003).
7. See U.K. IPR Commission Report, supra note 1.
8. Id. at ii.
9. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
10. See Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment,
and Technology Transfer (Int'l Fin. Corp., Discussion Paper No. 19, 1994). Not
surprisingly, it is a group funded by U.S.-based multinationals that first suggested linking
trade and intellectual property in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
context, and which produced the first draft text. See Andrea Koury Menescal, Those Behind
the TRIPS Agreement: The Influence of the ICC and the AIPPI on International Property
Decisions, Intell. Prop. Q., Spring 2005, at 155; see also Susan K. Sell, Private Power,
Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights 96-120 (2003).
11. See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy 199-205
(2000) (arguing that Intellectual Property Rights ("IPRs") can enhance economic growth in
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Article also considers the Doha Ministerial Declaration of November 2001
and follow-up work on access to medicines.
In Part II, this Article discusses recent economic analyses of the impact
of IP protection on bilateral trade flows and foreign direct investment
("FDI"). Appropriate distinctions are made between, inter alia, trade and
inward FDI. Wherever possible, lessons about the "right" level of
intellectual protection are drawn. Recent efforts in the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO") and the WTO are also discussed.
In the third and final part, this Article looks at the current quest for a
"balanced" approach and suggests ways in which such a balanced IP regime
could be constructed, as part of a broad, knowledge-oriented economic
strategy.
I. TRIPS
A. The Emergence of the TRIPS Agreement
The TRIPS Agreement was negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. In fact, TRIPS is Annex 1C of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. 12 As such, it was
part of a package. Negotiators came from an initial group of about twenty
countries, increased to approximately thirty; nearly half of the negotiators
came from industrialized nations; the remaining hailed from developing
countries. The representatives of developing nations were often trade
negotiators with little or no prior exposure to IP law and few even had
advanced legal training. This dissymmetry put them at a disadvantage
when discussing detailed and arcane drafting points, especially those linked
to the specific history of existing treaties such as the Berne and Paris
Conventions. 13
Some might argue that the dissimilarity in bargaining knowledge was
enhanced by the negotiating process. In the first few months of 1990, a
number of industrialized countries tabled, with little advance notice, 14 draft
legal texts of what they saw as the future TRIPS Agreement. Prior to the
developing countries in combination with other factors, including an open economy, foreign
direct investment, and human capital development).
12. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144-53 (1994) [hereinafter Results of the
Uruguay Round]. For a detailed negotiating history, see Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS
Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (2d ed. 2003).
13. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Conventioni, Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 303
[hereinafter Paris Convention]; see also Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field:
Addressing Information Distortion and Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 Minn. L. Rev.
249 (2003).
14. However, a draft TRIPS text (not as detailed), prepared by the private sector and a
Washington, D.C., lawyer, had been in circulation since the mid-1980s. See Sell, supra note
10, at 96-120; Menescal, supra note 10, at 155.
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tabling of these texts, the discussions had focused on identifying existing
norms and possible trade-related gaps therein, but the emerging outline of a
possible TRIPS result had essentially been at the level of principles, not
legal texts. The draft legal texts, which emanated from the European
Community, the United States, Japan, Switzerland, and Australia, 15
foreshadowed a detailed agreement covering all IP rights then in existence,
even the seldom used sui generis protection for computer chips. The
proposals also included detailed provisions on the enforcement of those
rights before national courts and customs authorities and a provision
bringing future TRIPS disputes under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT")/WTO dispute-settlement umbrella.16 These proposals
were far from obvious in light of the limited mandate of the TRIPS
negotiating group. 17
As a reaction, more than a dozen developing countries 18 proposed
another "legal" text, much more limited in scope, with few specific
normative aspects. They insisted on the need to maintain flexibility to
implement economic and social development objectives. In retrospect,
some developing countries may feel that the Uruguay Round Secretariat did
them a disservice by preparing a "composite" text, which melded all
industrialized countries' proposals into what became the "A" proposal,
while the developing countries' text became the "B" text. 19 The final
Agreement mirrored the "A" text. As such, it essentially embodied norms
that had been accepted 20 by industrialized countries. The concerns of
developing countries were reflected in large part in two provisions-
Articles 7 and 8.
In most cases, TRIPS negotiators incorporated existing international
norms by reference. Those norms were altered only to the extent that there
15. See Gervais, supra note 12, at 16-17. The U.S. and E.C. text were suggested by
private interest groups funded mostly from the pharmaceutical and entertainment industries.
See Sell, supra note 10, at 96; see also Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization 182-
85 (2004).
16. The lack of a dispute resolution mechanism on the international level (state-state)
was the main problem in enforcing obligations under the Berne Convention and the Paris
Convention. See Gervais, supra note 12, at 10. The World Trade Organization ("WTO")
dispute-settlement mechanism applies only to the disputes between states. See Results of the
Uruguay Round, supra note 12, arts. XI, XII.
17. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 September 1986,
MIN(86)/W/19, 25 I.L.M. 1623 (1986), available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/Punta-e.asp. (Punta del Este Declaration, launching the
Uruguay Round)
18. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru,
Tanzania, and Uruguay. Pakistan and Zimbabwe joined later on.
19. Then again, the Secretariat would perhaps respond that its mandate was to get to an
agreement, which did in fact happen. Is it the Secretariat's function somehow to
"compensate" for the respective clout of the countries involved and/or the degree of interest
they took in various aspects of the Round?
20. In some cases, the norms were accepted just a few years beforehand, such as with
the Berne Convention, ratified by the United States in 1989. See Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, §§ 7-9, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857-59 (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. 101 (2000)).
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was a "consensus" that they should be updated.21 This is true of the Paris,
Berne, and Washington treaties, which deal with copyright, industrial
property (patents, designs, and trademarks), and integrated circuits,
respectively.22 By and large, the so-called "North" thus imposed its then
most-advanced set of norms on the "South." In fact, major industrialized
countries made relatively few concessions, despite their disagreements on
some issues, 23 except the need to submit themselves to binding dispute
settlement. By contrast, developing countries were forced to accept a
package that they perhaps did not fully understand and yet contained a
complete set of IP norms they now had to implement into their national law.
The only true measures they obtained (in addition to Articles 7 and 8) were
transitional periods to implement the Agreement. For most developing
countries, transitional periods expired in January 2000.24
In many cases, developing countries did this because of significant
political concessions 25 in other sectors of the Round, such as tariffs on
tropical fruit or textiles. 26 At the time, there were very few people arguing
that TRIPS qua TRIPS was good in the short term for all developing
countries. Those countries accepted it as part of a package. The IP
component of that package, namely the TRIPS Agreement, adjusted the
level of IP protection to what was the highest common denominator among
major industrialized countries as of 1991.
21. See Gervais, supra note 12, at 68.
22. Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, May 26, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 1477 (1989), available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/washington/pdf/trtdocs-wo011.pdf (treaty never entered
into force but was used nonetheless as a foundation for TRIPS); Berne Convention, supra
note 13; Paris Convention, supra note 13.
23. The United States could not accept the Rome Convention for the Protection of
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, which protects
neighboring (or "related") rights. Therefore, the wording of TRIPS only refers to Rome with
respect to exceptions. See TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 14; see also Gervais, supra note 12, at
99-100. Also on this list are moral rights, the protection of biotechnological inventions
(which was not settled in Europe at the time), plant varieties, and geographical indications.
Given the comparable clout of the industrialized countries involved in discussions of these
issues, they were solved either by introducing exceptions (as in Article 9 on moral rights or
Article 27 for biotechnology) or by rather vague undertakings to negotiate further, as in
Article 24 (concerning geographical indications). See TRIPS, supra note 9, arts. 9, 24, 27.
24. The transitional period for pharmaceutical patents has been extended until 2016 for
least-developed countries in the Doha Declaration. See infra note 115 and accompanying
text.
25. For an interesting empirical analysis of how and why developing countries adopt
higher intellectual property ("IP") norms (in many cases not because they believe they need
or will benefit from them), see Robert L. Ostergard Jr., The Development Dilemma: The
Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights in the International System (2003).
26. A key difference between the WTO and organizations such as World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO") is that concessions are made in WTO negotiations across
negotiating sectors. For example, IP policy issues may be "abandoned" for lower tariffs on
cotton or coffee. Interestingly, these issues are sometimes linked. The protection of IP
rights in agricultural products, such as seeds, is becoming an increasingly important issue.
See World Bank, Intellectual Property Rights in Agriculture: The World Bank's Possible
Future Role in Assisting Borrower and Member Countries 62 (Uma Lele et al. eds., 1999).
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Some might say there is a certain degree of irony in TRIPS. The
multinational companies that successfully lobbied to establish a linkage
between IP and trade, first in'the domestic U.S. context and then in the
WTO, 2 7 did so because of their need to increase profit and markets or, to
put it differently, to maximize rent extraction and increase the number of
foreign territories into which they could consider expanding. Imposing this
harsh medicine on developing countries created difficult situations,
especially in poorer nations. However, it also created, or will lead to the
emergence of, new competitors for the same companies that lobbied for
TRIPS, as more developing nations at the receiving end of technology
transfers and inward FDI develop the ability to innovate and compete.
Combined with a healthy dose of economic nationalism,28 the medium-term
impacts of TRIPS and related measures, such as free-trade agreements and
bilateral investment treaties, the purpose of which are to bring developing
countries into the Western IP system,29 are certainly worth pondering.
Consider Japan after World War II and now, or China in 2000 and China
circa 2025.
Then again, under pressure to increase profits and shareholder value, the
multinational companies that sowed the TRIPS seed probably had no choice
but to pursue this course of action. A cynic might add that it also explains a
possible tendency on the part of some of those companies-and the United
States Trade Representative ("USTR") in bilateral agreements-not to
accompany TRIPS implementation with strong measures destined to
optimize local research, development, and innovation in developing
countries. 30 Rather, those companies could consider these countries as new
export markets, and lower-cost production centers, while maintaining the
technological superiority of the West, and, hence, continued economic
dominance. 31 But even if that is the plan, and a totally understandable one
from a business standpoint, 32 the powers of innovation,33 once unleashed,
27. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
28. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty,
92 Am. J. Int'l L. 621, 621-23 (1998).
29. See Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property:
Narratives of Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System,
7 Sing. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 315, 328-30 (2003).
30. See infra Part III.
31. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives 329 (2004). Suzanne Scotchmer
points out that
intellectual property rights are no longer a way to encourage domestic innovation.
They also become a strategic instrument to affect profit flows among nations. To
affect profit flows favorably, each country wants the strongest possible protections
in foreign countries, and the weakest possible protections for foreigners in its own
domestic market.
Id.
32. See Robert M. Sherwood, Some Things Cannot Be Legislated, 10 Cardozo J. Int'l &
Comp. L. 37, 39-40 (2002). Robert Sherwood states,
[A] robust intellectual property regime may indeed not be the objective sought for
developing countries by some global elites. The TRIPS level of protection may
serve their interests enough to protect their sales into those countries without
[Vol. 74
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and if properly supported, may cut the dominance short.34 For now,
however, large exporting firms are the clearest winners.3 5
B. Doha and the Public Health Issue
We are now in the midst of the Doha "Development" Round, which
started in Qatar in November 2001.36 The language of the Declaration
adopted in Doha is a measure of the change (at the multilateral level at
requiring a level of protection sufficiently robust to encourage local firms and
individuals to conduct research and make inventiors. In other words, from their
perspective, half a loaf for developing countries is just , fine.
Another way of putting this is to suggest that developing countries are asked by
TRIPS to go only half way in protecting intellectual property (primarily the
intellectual property of others) without going far enough to fully encourage their
own inventors and investors to build national intellectual property prowess.
Id. The recent efforts to implement "TRIPS Plus" protection would seem to contradict the
assertion that higher IP norms are not being pushed for fear of fostering innovators and
competitors in developing countries. However, by not disclosing the "secret formula" that
shows how IP norms form part of a broader knowledge optimization strategy-a point
developed in Part IB, infra-developed countries try to ensure continued technological
dominance.
33. See Robert M. Sherwood, Global Prospects for the Role of Intellectual Property in
Technology Transfer, 42 IDEA 27, 34 (2002) ("[Riobust protection will release a great deal
of energy into the economies of many of these countries.").
34. From this perspective, the end result of TRIPS for many developing countries, and
global welfare, would be very positive overall, especially compared with otherwise bleak
economic outlooks. See Michael P. Ryan, Knowledge-Economy Elites, the International Law
of Intellectual Property and Trade, and Economic Development, 10 Cardozo J. Int'l &
Comp. L. 271 (2002). In his conclusion, Michael Ryan notes,
In the foreword to the 1998/99 World Development Report: Knowledge for
Development, World Bank president James Wolfensohn states that "economies are
built not merely through the accumulation of physical capital and human skill, but
on a foundation of information, learning, and adaptation" and declares that in this
new world economy that the "globalization of trade, finance, and information flows
is intensifying competition, raising the danger that the poorest countries and
communities will fall behind more rapidly than ever before."... The WDR
recommends that closing knowledge gaps depend upon (1) the acquisition of
knowledge through trade, foreign direct investment, and licensing, (2) the
absorption of knowledge through education, and (3) the communication of
knowledge through advanced information technologies. Developing countries
intent upon closing knowledge gaps and reducing information problems will do so
with the help [ofi intellectual property institutions-trademark to facilitate
consumer knowledge, patent to facilitate technology transfer, copyright to facilitate
literary, artistic, and informational expression.
Id. at 303.
35. See Evelyn Su, The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Its Effects on Developing Countries, 23 Hous. J.
Int'l L. 169, 214 (2000).
36. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/M1N(01)/DEC/I, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/minist e/min0le/mindecl e.htm [hereinafter Doha
Declaration]. On the Doha process generally, see Gervais, supra note 12, at 43-51. See also
L. Danielle Tully, Note, Prospects for Progress: The TRIPS Agreement and Developing
Countries After the DOHA Conference, 26 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 129 (2003).
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least) since 1994. In the three paragraphs concerning TRIPS, there are
scant hooks on which to hang demands to increase IP protection.
First, paragraph 17 states that TRIPS should be implemented "in a
manner supportive of public health, by promoting both access to existing
medicines and research and development into new medicines. . . ."37 In the
following paragraph, the Declaration addresses a mostly North-North issue,
the completion of the negotiations on geographical indications on wines and
spirits. 38  The third and perhaps most well-known of the paragraphs
instructs the TRIPS Council to "examine, inter alia, the relationship
between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity,
the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore," 39 and other new
developments. In undertaking this work, the Declaration says, "the TRIPS
Council shall be guided by the objectives and principles set out in Articles 7
and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement 4° and shall take fully into account the
development dimension."4 1  In other words, apart from the possible
increase in protection of names of wines and spirits, the Doha Declaration
essentially reflects the concerns of developing countries. The first
paragraph insists on the balance between the need for access to IP and its
protection. Some might consider it as a philosophical underpinning for
ongoing discussions.
The separate Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,42
also adopted at Doha, emphasizes what had already been said in the
Declaration itself-that the TRIPS Agreement should not prevent WTO
Members from taking measures to protect public health. Such an
interpretation means that the TRIPS Agreement should be interpreted in
light of its objective and purpose, as expressed in the Agreement itself:
"Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom
to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted"; 43 "[e]ach
member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency" (where public health crises may
represent national emergency);44 and "[t]he effect of the provisions in the
TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual
property rights is to leave each Member free to establish its own regime for
such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the [Most Favored Nation]
and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4."45
37. Doha Declaration, supra note 36, para. 17.
38. Id. para. 18.
39. Id. para 19.
40. See TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 7, 8.
41. Doha Declaration, supra note 36, para. 19.
42. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2001), available
at http://docsonline.wto.org/.
43. Id. para. 5(b).
44. Id. para 5(c).
45. Id. para. 5(d).
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While the purpose of the Declaration is rather self-evident, the
importance of patents in preventing or reducing access to life-saving
pharmaceuticals is not. Patents may be more a part of the problem than of
the solution for certain developing countries coping with HIV or other
epidemics, and the Declaration may help them overcome that obstacle. Yet,
while a compulsory license should reduce patent (royalty) costs, it does not
eliminate the production costs or the problems associated with distribution
and timely administration of the medicines. 46
After intensive and difficult negotiations, the WTO General Council
adopted the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health in 2003. 4 7 This will allow, under
certain conditions, WTO members to export generic versions of drugs used
to treat diseases such as HIV/AIDS to countries that can neither afford nor
manufacture these pharmaceuticals. The Declaration is imperfect, 48 but my
point here is to draw attention to the process, which was designed to take
the needs of developing countries into account, not to criticize the result.
46. See, e.g., Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs
Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 J. Am.Med. Ass'n. 1886, 1886-1906
(2001); Srividhya Ragavan, The Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The Supreme
Court in PhRMA v. Walsh and the TRIPS Agreement, 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 777 (2004).
47. World Trade Organization, Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003,
WT/L/540 (2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tripse/implem_para6_e.htn; see also Carlos M.
Correa, Supplying Pharmaceuticals to Countries Without Manufacturing Capacity:
Examining the Solution Agreed Upon by the WTO on 30th August, 2003, 1 J. Generic Meds.
105-19 (2004).
48. See Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the
Developing World, 8 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 211, 236-37 (2004) ("Unfortunately, as
drafted, several paragraphs of the Implementation Agreement lend themselves to the
possibility of abuse or are otherwise unsatisfactory and potentially destabilizing to the entire
system of compulsory licensing."). Interestingly, as of April 2005, no country had made the
necessary notification to the WTO Secretariat to be able to invoke the Decision. See Thomas
F. Cotter, Market Fundamentalism and the TRIPS Agreement, 22 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.
307, 310-19 (2004); K.M. Gopakumar, The WTO Deal on Cheap Drugs: A Critique, 7 J.
World Intell. Prop. 99 (2004); Heald, supra note 13; Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?, 7 J. Int'l Econ. L.
73 (2004). For a view saying that the Declaration goes too far in favor of developing
countries and acts as a disincentive to research, see Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals,
Developing Countries, and the Doha "Solution," 3 Chi. J. Int'l L. 47 (2002).
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C. TRIPS and Traditional Knowledge
The protection of traditional knowledge49 has been discussed in
international fora over the last few years; 50 however, the Doha declaration
has now put it at center stage. 51 There are several reasons for the sudden
move of this issue to the forefront. First, a large number of countries
believe that, until now, they have not derived great benefits from
"traditional" forms of IP, yet they find themselves rich with traditional
knowledge, especially genetic resources and folklore. They would like to
exploit these resources, and several major companies share this interest.
The second reason is the growing political importance of aboriginal
communities in several countries. While pharmaceutical and
biotechnological companies are examining ways to exploit indigenous
medicinal knowledge, plants, and other resources that are often found in
developing countries, the Internet is progressively allowing creators of
folklore or folklore-based copyrighted material to disseminate their material
worldwide at a very low cost.
The protection of traditional knowledge, folklore, and genetic resources
is far from obvious, and raises fundamental questions about the current IP
49. Traditional knowledge is a shorter version of "traditional knowledge, innovations
and practices." See, e.g., The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5,
1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143, 31 I.L.M. 818, art. 8(j), available at
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf [hereinafter The Convention on Biological
Diversity]. The Draft U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples uses the
expression "indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional practices." Draft United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, at pmbl., U.N. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 46th
Sess., 36th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (Oct. 28, 1994),
reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 541, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/indigenous/main.html. In its
more recent documents, WIPO uses the expression "traditional knowledge, innovations and
creativity." World Intell. Prop. Org, Intellectual Property Needs and Expectations of
Traditional Knowledge Holders, WIPO Report on Fact-finding Missions on Intellectual
Property and Traditional Knowledge (1998-1999), at 17 (2001), available at
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/final/pdf/partl.pdf. Traditional knowledge includes
a broad range of subject matters, for example traditional agricultural, biodiversity-related
and medicinal knowledge and folklore. See Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge &
Intellectual Property: A TRIPS-Compatible Approach, 2005 Mich. St. L. Rev. 137.
50. For WIPO activities in this area, see generally WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/
(last visited Oct. 17, 2005). See also Aaron Cosbey, The Sustainable Development Effects of
the WTO TRIPS Agreement: A Focus on Developing Countries (1999), available at
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfin?filename=Sustainable Development Effects o
f the WTOTRI.htm; Chakravarthi Raghavan, ASEAN for Protecting
Indigenous/Traditional Knowledge, Third World Network, May 5, 2000, available at
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/asean.htm; John Mugabe, Intellectual Property Protection
and Traditional Knowledge: An Exploration in International Policy Discourse, Nov. 1998,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/hr/paneldiscussion/papers/pdf/mugabe.pdf.
51. Paragraph 19 reads in part as follows: "[Ministers] instruct the Council for TRIPS,
in pursuing its work program... to examine, inter alia, the relationship between the TRIPS
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the protection of traditional
knowledge and folklore, and other relevant new developments raised by Members pursuant
to Article 71.1 ." Doha Declaration, supra note 36.
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framework, itself exclusively a product of evolution in the Western world.52
In addition to posing questions about notions of authorship, work, utility,
novelty, 53 public domain, etc., certain observers suggest that the nature of
the exclusive rights and the underlying economic theories based on
incentive and reward are misplaced. Traditional knowledge, they argue, is
centered around respect, not innovation. It is noncommercial in nature and
does not seek to expand the public domain. 54 And while existing legal rules
may be used to protect certain forms of traditional knowledge, important
potential conflicts remain.55
This explains why the debate on these issues is essentially twofold. It
consists, first, of a criticism of current rules and, second, of proposals for
specific, sui generis protection of traditional knowledge. 56 In the latter
case, in addition to the development of treaty provisions under the aegis of
WIP0 57-which could serve, at least initially, on a regional basis-work in
the Doha Round might lead to political recognition of the validity of some
of the demands made by developing countries rich in traditional
knowledge. 58
II. ECONOMICS
A. Recent Surveys
This section examines a number of recent analyses of available empirical
evidence about the impact of IP protection. Clearly, the analysis is far from
exhaustive. It only tries to identify trends. It is also worth noting that, in
52. See Daniel Gervais, Spiritual But Not Intellectual? The Protection of Sacred
Intangible Traditional Knowledge, 11 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 467 (2003); Gervais,
supra note 49.
53. See Heald, supra note 13, at 275-79.
54. See Michael H. Davis, Some Realism About Indigenism, 11 Cardozo J. Int'l &
Comp. L. 815, 818 (2003) ("The claims that the indigenous have a right to share in the
profits of the use of their cultural information certainly smacks of some moral claims, and
thus gains some apparent legitimacy. It is also consistent with the classical commercial
goals of IP. But the subject matter, of course, is not consistent with IP-it is not innovative,
it exists in the public domain, and thus IP protection serves none of the classical purposes of
IP.").
55. See Jean Raymond Homere, Intellectual Property Rights Can Help Stimulate the
Economic Development of Least Developed Countries, 27 Colum. J.L. & Arts 277 (2004);
see also Daniel Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New Challenges
from the Very Old and the Very New, 12 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 929
(2002).
56. See Paul Kuruk, Bridging the Gap Between Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual
Property Rights: Is Reciprocity an Answer?, 7 J. World Intell. Prop. 429 (2004).
57. See, e.g., World Intellectual Prop. Org., Draft Provisions on the Protection of
Traditional Knowledge (2005), available at
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/consultations/draftprovisions/draftprovisions.html (last visited
Oct. 17, 2005); World Intellectual Prop. Org., Draft Provisions on the Protection of
Traditional Cultural Expressions/Folklore (2005), available at
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/consultations/draft_provisions/draftprovisions.html (last visited
Oct. 17, 2005).
58. See generally Gervais, supra note 49.
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contrast to the very large number of studies dealing with the impact of IP
protection of one type or another in major industrialized nations, there is a
relative dearth of empirical analyses of the nature and impact of IP in
developing economies.
Studies, however, are starting to emerge. Those consulted in the
preparation of this paper 59 offer a blurred and complex picture of the
advantages of higher IP protection in developing economies. A simple
equation cannot be drawn between an increase in trade following the
introduction of TRIPS-compatible IP protection, on the one hand, and
economic development on the other, especially when measured in terms of
welfare increases. 60 There are, however, at least two indicators that are
helpful to analyze the impact of increasing protection, namely (a) the
increase of trade flows in goods that include a significant IP component (as
compared to the physical value of the material and components-for
example, a music CD or a patented pharmaceutical molecule; such areas
may be referred to as "intellectual property sensitive"); and (b) the increase
in FDI concerning goods or services that require a high level of IP
protection. It is essential to measure both because, to a certain extent, they
cancel each other out: a company in country A (export) may have the
ability to send goods to country B, but it may instead opt for local
production (under license) in country B. Their analysis is based on data
available from eighty-nine countries. Their main conclusion is that higher
levels of IP protection are useful in areas other than fuel (and, presumably,
59. Some of the more notable, recent, and non-country-specific efforts include: U.K.
IPR Commission Report, supra note 1; Intellectual Property and Development (Carsten Fink
& Keith E. Maskus eds., 2004); World Bank, The Uruguay Round and the Developing
Economies (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1995), available at
http://econ.worldbank.org; Suzanne Scotchmer, The Political Economy of Intellectual
Property Treaties, 20 J. L. Econ. & Org. 415, 435-36 (2004). Suzanne Scotchmer states,
National treatment increases incentives to innovate, especially in an
environment where local markets are not large enough to support invention.
However, national treatment also creates problems.... [ilt can lead to an
asymmetry where, for a particular subiect matter, one country protects all
innovation that takes place in the member states, and consumers in the other
member states free ride. But for subject matters that do not require extensive
protection, there is a more natural and more equitable asymmetry, which national
treatment does not permit. The more natural solution would be for each country to
protect its own innovators, and for countries to exchange spillover benefits.
Scotchmer, supra, at 435-36; see also Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., OECD Science,
Technology and Industry Outlook 2004 (2004); Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev.,
Patents, Innovation and Economic Performance: OECD Conference Proceedings (2004).
60. Carsten Fink & Carlos A. Primo Braga, How Stronger Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights Affects International Trade Flows, in Intellectual Property and
Development, supra note 59, at 21 ("The implications of IPRs for economic welfare are
complex. The simple fact that trade flows rise or fall in response to tighter IPRs is not
sufficient for drawing conclusions regarding economic welfare. Both static and dynamic
effects need to be considered."). Obviously, an increase in overall economic development
may not translate into a reduction of poverty. Other factors, such as wealth distribution and
corruption are relevant. See, e.g., Bhagwati, supra note 15, at 54-60, 199-202.
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raw resources pre-value-added transformation) and, surprisingly, high
technology.61
The traditional view, supported by case studies in countries such as post
war Japan, is that high IP protection, especially of patent rights, will lead to
higher FDI. 62 However, in a recent analysis of the FDI component and its
relation to IP, Professor Keith Maskus concluded that many other factors
influence FDI and technology transfer decisions, including market
liberalization and deregulation, technology development policies, and
competition regimes.63 Foreign firms invest internationally if there are
location advantages and if it is more profitable for them to produce in that
country rather than licensing their IP. Firms are more apt to invest in
countries that implement strong IP protections (and to bring their IP or
allow for licenses in such countries). Transnational firms may also choose
to invest in vertical FDI (where different plants produce products that can
be used by the plant "above" it as an input to their product).64
The conclusions of Professor Maskus's study65 are based on data from
the International Monetary Fund showing increases in inward and outward
FDI between the years 1987 and 1995. Pre-2000 data may not offer ideal
61. In fact, those results seem at odds with Mansfield's 1994 study of U.S. business
executives, which found that IP protection influenced mostly executives in high tech
industries. See Mansfield, supra note 10. For a discussion, see Paul J. Heald, Misreading a
Canonical Work: An Analysis of Mansfield's 1994 Study, 10 J. Intell. Prop. L. 309 (2003).
Maskus and Fink suggest five possible explanations as to why there is no measurable
positive impact in the case of high technology goods: 1) Strong market power may offset the
positive market expansion effects of higher protection; 2) higher foreign direct investment
(FDI) may lower international trade (as discussed above); 3) it is possible that the impact of
intellectual property protection was not accurately measured; 4) factors in the destination
country (country of export) may matter more than intellectual property (including first mover
advantage); and 5) finally, tariff and non-tariff barriers may impede trade flows. See
Intellectual Property and Development, supra note 59, at 28.
62. See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, 32
Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 471, 481-85 (2000); see also Keith E. Maskus & Christine
McDaniel, Impacts of the Japanese Patent System on Productivity Growth, 11 Japan &
World Econ. 557 (1999).
63. Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging FDI and Technology
Transfer, in Intellectual Property and Development, supra note 59, at 70-71; see also Carsten
Fink, Patent Protection, Transnational Corporations, and Market Structure: A Simulation
Study of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, in Intellectual Property and Development,
supra note 59, at 250-51. In his summary of a study by Ginarte and Park, Juan C. Ginarte &
Walter G. Park, Determinants of Patent Rights: A Cross-National Study, 26 Res. Pol'y 283,
285-86 (1997), Professor Maskus notes that those authors
found that the strength of patent rights across countries and over time depended
positively on real GDP per capita, the share of R&D in GDP, openness to
international trade, and a measure of the freedom of markets from arbitrary and
non-transparent government regulation. Human capital, measured by the secondary
school enrollment ratio in an earlier period, was a positive and marginally
significant contributor to patent rights.
Maskus, supra note 62, at 477.
64. See Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsen Fink, The Relationship
Between Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 Duke J. Comp. &
Int'l L. 163, 172-73 (1998).
65. See Maskus, supra note 63.
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parameters to do a full analysis of the current situation. In many cases, IPR
protection increased sharply after the TRIPS Agreement entered into force
in developing countries, which, except for the least-developed ones, had
until January 2000 to comply. 66 Interestingly, in China's case, the date of
TRIPS compliance coincided with its becoming a WTO member on
December 11, 2001.67 The author of a study dealing with China agreed
with Edwin Mansfield 68 that there was only a weak correlation between
higher IP and increased FDI in that market.69 Another developing-country-
specific study that compared African countries to India and China found
significantly lower FDI numbers in Africa despite higher levels of IP
protection. 70
Another study, this one concerning the situation of FDI in so-called
"transition economies," 71 is perhaps more illuminating because those
countries were, for the most part, closed to FDI until approximately 1990.
The study confirmed intuitive conclusions, in particular that FDI in IP
sensitive areas is discouraged when IP protection is weak, and that, across
all sectors, low IPR protection encourages foreign firms to focus on
distribution rather than local production. 72
In the specific area of pharmaceuticals, available data analyzed in another
study illustrates that, at least for the large Indian market, the introduction of
patent protection is likely to lead to increased research and development,
price increases, and related welfare effects. However, research also shows
that only 10.9% of the top five hundred pharmaceuticals in this market are
patented. Additionally, the government retained certain tools including
66. TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 65. For patents on pharmaceuticals in countries where
patents were previously unavailable for inventions of that type, the transitional period ended
on January 1, 2005. See id. art, 65(4).
67. See World Trade Org., Understanding the WTO 112 (3d ed. 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis-e/tif e/understandinge.pdf.
68. See Mansfield, supra note 10.
69. See Yahong Li, Pushing For Greater Protection: The Trend Toward Greater
Protection of Intellectual Property in the Chinese Software Industry and the Implications for
Rule of Law in China, 23 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 637, 638-41 (2002); Keith E. Maskus, The
Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and
Technologv Transfer, 9 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 109, 115-19 (1998) (noting that FDI
increased ten-fold in China prior to the introduction of TRIPS-compatible norms); Mikhaelle
Schiappacasse, Intellectual Property Rights in China: Technology Transfers and Economic
Development, 2 Buff. Intell. Prop. L.J. 164 (2004); Peter K. Yu et al., China and the WTO:
Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 Colum. J. Asian L. 1 (2003).
70. See Ragavan, supra note 46, at 789; Sherwood, supra note 33, at 33-34
(emphasizing the need for proper enforcement mechanisms).
71. Essentially, these are countries in Central and Eastern Europe that formed part of the
former Soviet bloc. Article 65(3) of the TRIPS Agreement refers to them as "[m]ember[s]
which [are] in the process of transformation from a centrally-planned [economy] into a
market, free-enterprise economy and which [are] undertaking structural reform of [their]
intellectual property system[s] .... TRIPS, supra note 9.
72. See Beata Smarzynska Javorcik, The Composition of Foreign Direct Investment and
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Evidence from Transition Economies, 48 Eur.
Econ. Rev. 39 (2004).
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price controls and, in cases where Article 31 of TRIPS allows, compulsory
licenses. 73
The U.K. IPR Commission Report74 presents a picture consistent with
the above findings but also stresses that it is important not to consider
developing countries as a homogeneous group.75 In fact, a fairly well
developed sequencing phenomenon exists. In an impoverished country,
there is little rent that foreign firms can extract. Furthermore, there is
scarce technology to copy or improve on high technology goods, and it is
unlikely that the country in question can benefit from technology transfer.
FDI is unlikely because of factors unrelated to IP, such as infrastructure, or
absence of a viable domestic market. 76 International firms take notice when
a country becomes both a piracy threat and a potential market, even if the
threat is limited to a fairly small percentage of the population.77 While
countries that implement IP norms may benefit from increased local
development and inward FDI, they may also incur job losses in established
copycat industries and welfare costs associated with higher local prices. 78
However, consumers benefit from knowing they are purchasing the genuine
product, especially in areas where the quality of the goods is essential. 79
In sum, economic analysis tends to demonstrate that sufficient IP
protection is an essential component of increased inward FDI and trade
flows in IP-sensitive goods for countries above a certain economic
development threshold. The trade regime (especially tariffs and non-tariff
barriers), tax, and competition laws are also potent influences.
B. Analysis
There is an important difference between increased trade flows (in this
case in the form of imports) and inward FDI when economic development
is taken into account. When higher IP rules allow foreign firms to begin
exporting IP-sensitive goods and services to a country, local consumers and
industries gain lawful access to those products and services. This may
result in welfare gains. This may also, however, lead to price increases,
especially when goods whose status changes to "pirate" or "counterfeit"
after the introduction of IPR protection are displaced by genuine goods sold
at a higher price. Increased trade flows may lead to new jobs in
distributorships and the retail sector, but these are likely to be low-skilled,
low-paying positions. There also may be significant gains in terms of
product quality and reliability, most notably in the area of pharmaceuticals.
73. See Fink, supra note 63, at 250-51.
74. See U.K. IPR Commission Report, supra note 1.
75. Id. at 1-2.
76. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
77. For a discussion on the situation in Kenya, see J.M. Migai Akech, The African
Growth Opportunity Act: Implications for Kenya's Trade and Development, 33 N.Y.U. J.
Int'l L. & Pol. 651 (2001).
78. See Heald, supra note 13; see also Maskus, supra note 62, at 480-8 1.
79. See Maskus, supra note 62, at 487-88.
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Inward FDI is a more powerful economic development lever than trade.
It transfers technology and usually creates jobs requiring a higher skill
level. This may be the case for the manufacturing of technology-intensive
goods, which requires engineering and quality-control positions, as well as
management and other softer skill sets. In the best-case scenario, some
research and development jobs are created, which may have spillover
effects in areas such as higher education, or local laboratories.
Inward FDI also informs the attitude a government should take towards
publicly funded and university-based research. The U.S. Bayh-Dole Act 80 is
a good example. The Act
arguably constitutes the single most important event, as it expanded both
the range of entities patenting inventions and the types of inventions being
patented. Following passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, universities and
research institutes increased their patent filings dramatically, further
blurring the line between commercial and basic-science research. 8 1
The Act, it has been argued, has led to a major increase in research and
development at American universities. 82 Yet, others argue that when all
social costs are accounted for, the data suggests that an open approach
would produce better overall effects. 83 Should governments err on the side
of protection or, instead, protect the public domain? Should governments
take the policy gamble of increasing protection to test whether it produces
positive results without major or overwhelming negative externalities?
Indeed, it may be easier to make IP ex post facto and adjust the framework,
rather than look for a perfect model to merge from theoretical economic
analysis. In addition, each sector of IP could be considered separately, and
possibly sub-sectors: Should industrial machines, business models,
biotechnology, and chemical agricultural products all be treated the same
because they are protected by patents?
As to sector-specific impacts, in the absence of sufficient rights and
enforcement options, one may reasonably conclude that in the copyright
arena, music, films, and books are unlikely to be distributed and national
cultural industries are unlikely to develop. In these areas, the gains
generated by establishing sufficient protection are "unambiguous." 84
However, the introduction or beginning of enforcement of copyrights may
also lead to the closure of businesses that rely on copying, thus displacing
(mostly unskilled) workers. Ideally, some of these workers will be able to
find work in the new, creative industry jobs made possible by the adequate
80. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000).
81. David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 985, 989 (2005).
82. See Susan K. Finston, The Relevance of Genetic Resources to the Pharmaceutical
Industry-The Industrv Viewpoint, 8 J. World Intell. Prop. 141 (2005).
83. See Amy Kapczynski, Samantha Chaifetz, Zachary Katz & Yochai Benkler,
Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University
Innovations, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1031 (2005).
84. Keith E. Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in Lebanon, in
Intellectual Property and Development, supra note 59, at 286, 289.
[Vol. 74
THE STATE OF PLA Y
protection of copyrights. 85 Such jobs are likely to pay higher wages and
stimulate creativity, while reducing the need felt by local creators to live in
higher protection countries as exiles. In high technology sectors, such as
the manufacturing of computer chips and advanced electronic components,
the level of protection is less relevant due to the inability to reverse
engineer and produce pirated versions and the market power of the main
international players. 86
Trademark protection is an essential ingredient to generating higher
inward FDI. The purpose of trademarks is manifold. Trademarks protect
the public by indicating the source of goods and services so that purchasers
can identify the desired level of quality and receive a similar product or
consistent service over time. Trademarks protect the trademark owner
against commercial misappropriation of the mark and/or the goodwill
associated with the mark. The value of a mark stems from the mental link
that is created over time in the minds of prospective buyers between
particular goods or services and a particular source. Many people will buy
a product or service because consciously or unconsciously they associate
qualities such as value, excellence, or efficiency with the trademark. A
strong trademark is invaluable because the ability of a mark to raise these
associations directs a potential buyer towards a company's own product or
service rather than those of a competitor. Trademarks are influenced both
by sellers' perceptions about buyers' psychology and the public's
marketing-influenced perceptions of how goods and services are
differentiated. Trademarks also serve an informational purpose: The legal
protection of marks gives companies an incentive to invest in making their
marks more recognizable and easier to remember so consumers can more
easily identify which particular good or service they want.
Introducing trademark protection will, as in the case of copyrights, lead
to the closure of businesses producing counterfeit goods. That economic
activity, however, could be replaced by jobs in distribution, retail, and
franchises. 87  These are, however, often low-level, low-skilled jobs.
Trademark protection will also benefit consumers who will have access to
"genuine" goods, i.e., goods that come with the perceived assurance of
quality associated with the mark via domestic or international advertising
and reputation. Over time, the experience in product assembly, delivery,
servicing, and management acquired through franchise and distributorship
arrangements may be transferred to new, local businesses.
Patents are also directly relevant. Patents do not ensure that new
products will be supplied in the short term. When patent protection is
unavailable, products that would otherwise infringe a patent could be made
available legally for the domestic market. In terms of FDI, however, the
impact is exactly the opposite, because global firms relying on patent
85. See id. at 286-87.
86. See Fink & Braga, supra note 60, at 34.
87. See Amir H. Khoury, The Effects of Trademarks on Arab Countries in the Middle
East (June 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Haifa) (on file with author).
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protection need assurances about the level of protection and enforcement
before considering any significant technology transfer. Fully exploiting a
patent often requires expertise that is not fully disclosed in the published
patent or patent application. Ongoing research and variants of the patented
inventions may also exist. For this reason, firms also consider the level of
protection of trade secrets for information that, for strategic or other
reasons, is not disclosed in a patent. In fact, for certain process patents,
even in the presence of a presumption that a product not previously
available results from a new patented process, 88 many companies prefer not
to disclose new processes in patent applications.89 Direct patent-related
inward FDI is often the best way to create high-paying, highly skilled jobs,
and it is therefore highly sought after by many governments willing to go to
great lengths to attract foreign firms.90
From this standpoint, TRIPS was not only necessary to maximize the rent
that could be extracted from emerging foreign markets, but it was also a
difficult yet essential measure to jumpstart global economic development.
Related beliefs hold that the misuse of "Western" IP was comparable to
theft or "piracy" and that increased foreign revenues would lead to higher
overall levels of research and development. IP as "policy castor oil"
suggests that countries should overlook the distasteful aspects of
introducing or increasing IP protection and enforcement in exchange for
longer term economic health.91
A different and perhaps more cynical view of international IP-which
may be very closely aligned with the actual view of business-is that the
purpose of TRIPS is simply to enhance global welfare, not welfare
measured by country or even by region. If multinational pharmaceutical,
software, or entertainment firms can reap additional profits from developing
nations, new goods and services will result due to higher investment in
88. Article 34(1) of the TRIPS Agreement reads in relevant part: "[I]f the subject matter
of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall have the
authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical product is
different from the patented process." TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 34(1).
89. See A Patent System for the 21st Century 20-23 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds.,
2004), available at http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystemi/0309089107.pdf.
90. See Javorcik, supra note 72, at 60.
91. A recent newspaper article articulated the following point:
By protecting marketing exclusivity, the industry says, the trade agreement [in
this CAFTA, the Central American Free Trade Agreement] would also spur
innovation and encourage pharmaceutical companies to register drugs in the
smaller countries, ultimately helping to deliver the drugs to the needy. It is a
philosophical argument that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has
embraced. "Trade rules that protect innovation and research foster a system that
produces the types of medicines that American health consumers and health
consumers around the world use and need to fight diseases," said Richard Mills, a
spokesman for the trade office.
Stephanie Saul, U.S. Drug Makers Win Little-Seen Victory in Trade Pact, Int'l Herald Trib.,
July 2, 2005, at 10. One can readily discern that the higher level of protection ("TRIPS
Plus") will allow international pharmaceutical companies to extract higher rents from those
countries. The article does not explain how "health consumers" in Central America would
afford the new medicines or how the pact will help "deliver drugs to the needy."
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research and development, etc. Additional profits may benefit mostly
consumers in richer countries, but still increase welfare when measured
globally.
There is a countervailing view that IP norms should be fair to developing
countries as well as more economically developed nations.92 Professor
Alan 0. Sykes argues that the gains to the developed countries could
outweigh the developing countries' losses: "Even if Professor Scherer were
right about the rnegativel welfare impact of pharmaceutical patents on
developing countries viewed in isolation, the odds that such patents will
nevertheless enhance global welfare appear particularly favorable in this
sector." 93
Sykes suggests that introducing high levels of IP protection in developing
countries induces firms to invent products of particular interest to the
developing countries (e.g., anti-malaria drugs) and to engage in technology
transfer. 94 Without uniform rules, there may be a "collective action"
problem. The problem arises because an individual developing country
may benefit more if it chooses to have weak patent laws, while the other
developing countries have strong patent laws; that way, an individual
country can obtain the benefits of inducing the invention of products of
particular interest to developing countries without having to pay the costs.95
TRIPS solves the collective action problem by requiring all of the member
nations to have strong IP protection. Sykes further argues that compulsory
licensing reduces the pharmaceutical industry's incentive to undertake
research into diseases that are endemic principally to the developing
world.96
In responding to Professor Sykes's arguments, Professor Thomas F.
Cotter suggests,
Even in the presence of strong patent rights, the developing nations'
willingness to pay may be so constrained that little incentive will exist
anyway for the pharmaceutical companies to engage in much of this type
of research and development. Indeed, most observers who have
considered this issue have concluded that it will take much more than
strong patent rights to induce this type of research. Even in the United
States, it took the Orphan Drug Act97 to make research into some drugs
92. For a critical assessment of this argument, see Frederic M. Scherer, Industry
Structure, Strategy and Public Policy 362-66 (1996). See also Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to
Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 Am. U.
L. Rev. 131, 192-93 (2000).
93. Sykes, supra note 48, at 62.
94. Id. at 65-66.
95. Id.; see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13
UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 166, 169-78 (1994).
96. See Sykes, supra note 48, at 62-66; see also Shanker A. Singham, Competition
Policy and the Stimulation of Innovation: TRIPS and the Interface Between Competition
andPatent Protection in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 363 (2002).
97. Under the Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (2000), the United States
government provides funding, tax benefits, and exclusive marketing rights to drug
companies undertaking research into diseases affecting relatively small numbers of people.
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with relatively small demand profitable. Thus, even if the TRIPs
Declaration marginally decreases the incentive to engage in research into
tropical diseases, there remain (unfortunately) other obstacles that are
much more significant; to argue against the Declaration on this ground is
to let the tail wag the dog.98
III. KNOWLEDGE
Many of the studies mentioned in Part II insist on the fact that sufficient
and adequate IP protection is but one ingredient in a complex recipe to
achieve a successful economic development souffl. Put differently, IPR
protection is essential, but in itself insufficient, to ensure growth. In fact, IP
rules arguably benefit mostly major owners of IP who are largely
concentrated in a few Western countries and Japan. Each country needs a
comprehensive knowledge optimization strategy to successfully exploit IP
to maximize its economic growth in areas that are information and IP
intensive and to be able to produce goods and services with a higher
ideational content (which is what IP rules tend to protect). The adequate
protection of commercially or industrially relevant knowledge forms part of
such a strategy.
If the above seems fair in light of the economic studies discussed in Part
II, those studies are also illuminating by what they do not and perhaps
cannot show. It is extremely difficult to isolate the importance of the IP
factor in the growth of bilateral trade flows and FDI. It is even more
difficult to determine the optimal level of protection. This is partly due to
the fact that the TRIPS Agreement imposes global minimum standards, and
there remain very few statistically significant options to compare various
levels of protection below that floor. That problem certainly has theoretical
significance in assessing the validity of econometric studies and the field of
available (versus ideal) field of empirical data. However, a problem in
theory actually forms part of the solution once we shift to policy setting.
The TRIPS Agreement is arguably the strongest normative vector in
setting IP policy. WTO members cannot legislate below the TRIPS level
without incurring the risk of dispute-settlement proceedings under the
Dispute-Settlement Understanding ("DSU"),99 and it is unlikely that TRIPS
See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in
International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 193, 215-16
(2003).
98. Thomas F. Cotter, Market Fundamentalism and the TRIPS Agreement, 22 Cardozo
Arts & Ent. L.J. 307, 335-36 (2004).
99. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/28-dsu.pdf (hereinafter DSU]; see also Gervais,
supra note 12, at 340-44. Not all countries are equal when it comes to the DSU. The E.U.
and U.S. have resisted applying decisions of the DSU that found their legislation
incompatible with their WTO obligations. The long-standing dispute between the E.U. and
the so-called "dollar banana" countries is an example. See Appellate Body Report, European
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norms will be diluted in the Doha Round. 100 Therefore, it would be
pragmatically justified to take TRIPS as a given in the IP-policy equation.
The available flexibility in implementing the Agreement must be
determined only as part of a comprehensive strategy. This Article argues
below that integrating TRIPS norms into such a strategy is tactically sound
and that TRIPS strikes an adequate balance if properly implemented,
especially when compared to the emerging "TRIPS Plus" norms. 101
The strategy outlined below is not a series of measures designed to
nominally implement TRIPS rules or find loopholes to shrink the protection
they offer. Proposed interpretations of Articles 27 and 30 of TRIPS1 02 and
the fact that the Agreement in many cases imposes no clear rules as to the
ownership of IPRs mean that a country can formally implement TRIPS
while de-implementing parts of it through such legal "gimmickry" (though
not illegitimately) and perhaps "get away with it" as far as the WTO
dispute-settlement system is concerned. The objective of this Article is
rather to suggest ways to optimize knowledge and economic development
using TRIPS rules as an ingredient. This may involve some flexibility in
the implementation process but only as part of a comprehensive strategy.
A. TRIPS Viewed as Part of the "Right Balance"
As mentioned, it is difficult and probably impossible on the basis of
available empirical data to determine the optimal level of IP protection. Is
the best term of protection for a patent twenty years, eighteen, or twenty-
two? Or is it five or thirty-five? For copyright, is it ten years, life of the
Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries,
WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004) available at http://docsonline.wto.org. In the United
States, a panel decision concerning the incompatibility of exceptions contained in §
110(5)(b) of the Copyright Act rendered in 2000 remains unimplemented as of this writing.
See Richard Owens, TRIPS and the Fairness in Music Arbitration: The Repercussions, 25
Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 49, 49-54 (2003).
100. See Gervais, supra note 12, at 43-51.
101. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
102. For example, UNCTAD recently suggested that
[tihe exclusions in Article 27:3 are framed more narrowly, yet again leave
substantial room for interpretation. For example, Article 27:3(a) permits the
exclusion of "therapeutic methods" for the treatment of humans. The use of
pharmaceuticals is a method of therapy for treating human health conditions, and
so arguably... a Member could exclude the use of drugs for medical treatment
from patent protection.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., Dispute Settlement, World Trade
Organization, 3.14 TRIPS, at 20 (2003), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add18_en.pdf (prepared by Frederick M.
Abbott, Florida State University Collge of Law, at the request of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development). I do not share the view that a panel would agree
with this interpretation. Regarding Article 30, the same report indicates that "[tihe ordinary
meaning of the terms in Article 30 would appear to allow considerable flexibility to
Members in adopting exceptions to the rights of patent holders," id. at 22, which may create
a sense of "flexibility" with which many panels may not agree.
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author plus fifty or seventy years? 10 3 One would probably conclude that,
for certain forms of invention or creation-indeed for specific inventions or
works-a certain term is optimal, while a different one is more adequate in
a different context. 104 This analysis could depend, for example, on the
added value of the invention, which depends in turn on the size of its
inventive step, 105 and the degree to which this step overlaps the predictable
industrial or commercial applicability of the invention. One could add to
the equation the degree of true competition in the industrial or economic
sector impacted by the invention and, correlatively, whether there are
dominant players by market share.
TRIPS, one could argue, is a valid instrument also because it only
harmonizes national laws to a degree. 10 6 This is not the place for a
summary of the content of TRIPS. 10 7 Evidently, it contains more than
simple "wishes," in contrast to many provisions of the Paris Convention. 10 8
A country must provide protection of copyrights, certain related rights,
trademarks, industrial designs, certain geographical indications, patents on
most classes of inventions, certain forms of confidential information, and,
last, and in this case least, topographies of integrated circuits, in each case
for a specified period of time. On the other hand, however, there is
considerable flexibility in how the rights and protected subject matter are
103. See Eldred. v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003). It has been argued that the
current U.S. and European term of "life plus 70 years" is the economic equivalent of
perpetual protection. See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan. L. Rev.
485, 522 (2004). Christopher Sprigman writes:
The copyright term is now sufficiently long that the net present value to the
rightsholder of a copyright is practically indistinguishable from what it would be
under a perpetual term. In an amicus curiae brief submitted to the Supreme Court
in support of the petitioners in Eldred v. Ashcroft, a group of economists that
included Nobel Prize winners George Akerlof, Kenneth Arrow, James Buchanan,
Ronald Coase, and Milton Friedman argued that the current, post-CTEA copyright
term of life plus seventy years has a net present value that is 99.88% of the value
of a perpetual term.
Id.
104. One ex post sign would be whether the invention is still actively being exploited at
the expiration of the patent. However, if only inventions whose value had lapsed fell into the
public domain, the societal value of granting a twenty-year monopoly would come into
question. In the United States, there is a long history of extending the term of specific
patents by private bills. See Caren L. Stanley, A Dangerous Step Toward the Over Protection
of Intellectual Property: Rethinking Eldred v. Ashcroft, 26 Hamline L. Rev. 679, 694-5
(2003). Historically, the term of a patent was set by private bill until a standard term was
introduced into federal law. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and
Constitutional Norms, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 272, 338-39 (2004).
105. In the area of pharmaceuticals, a difference is often made between pioneer drugs and
so-called "me-too" drugs. The latter are variations on a molecule developed by another
laboratory which tends to have the same physiological/therapeutic effect, but without
infringing the "pioneer's" patent. See U.S. v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453 (1983).
106. See Jerome H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflicts or
Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 441 (2000).
107. See generally Gervais, supra note 12.
108. For a trademark-related example, see the Paris Convention, supra note 13, art. 6(1)
("The conditions for the filing and registration of trademarks shall be determined in each
country of the Union by its domestic legislation.").
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defined,10 9 owned, " 0 managed, I"' or subject to exceptions."12 In the area
of enforcement, the Agreement recognizes that the implementation in a
given WTO member may be impacted by the availability of resources. 113
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD")
published a detailed document on the flexibility of TRIPS."14 Another
example is the delay until 2016 in protecting pharmaceuticals by patents
granted to least-developed countries. 115
Admittedly, developing economies typically need a different set of rules.
As UNCTAD put it,
[E]xperience shows that there is a need for policy instruments specifically
designed with the aim of helping countries at lower stages of development
to converge on the levels of efficiency and affluence achieved by the
more advanced economies, and to improve the welfare of all groups of the
population. Making this the principle for policy design at both the
domestic and the international level requires recognition of the fact that
successful development and integration of the developing countries is in
the mutual interest of all countries, as longer-term growth and trading
opportunities of the more advanced economies also depend on the
expansion of industrial capacity and markets in the poorer economies.116
Yet, I suggest that, as far as IP is concerned, there is sufficient policy-
related "room to move" within TRIPS, even though the major "concession"
to developing countries other than least-developed ones was a set of
transitional periods, which primarily ended in January 2000 and in January
2005 for pharmaceutical patents.117
109. For example, while Article 27 states that WTO members must protect "inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new,
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application," the terms "new,"
"inventive step," and "capable of industrial application" are not defined. See TRIPS, supra
note 9, art. 27.
110. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriation Act
of 1998, paras. 215-21, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org.
111. For instance, rules as to the ownership of collective marks or whether and how
copyright and related rights are to be managed (collectively or otherwise) are not explicitly
mentioned in the Agreement.
112. Many exceptions are only limited by the "three-step test" contained in TRIPS
Articles 13, 26(2), and 30. See Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core International
Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 1 (2005).
113. TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 41(5).
114. See supra note 102.
115. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the
Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country
Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, IP/C/25 (July 1,
2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/pres02-e/pr30 l_e.htm.
116. United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., Trade and Development Report 96
(2004), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr2004_en.pdf [hereinafter Trade and
Development Report].
117. TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 65(2), (4). In the case of pharmaceutical patents, least-
developed countries now have until 2016. See supra note 115 and accompanying text; see
also Reichman, supra note 106, at 442 n.3.
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Therefore, I suggest that countries should not "fight" TRIPS. They can
use its built-in normative elasticity to reconcile the new norms to the extent
possible with their industrial, cultural,"18 legal, and economic parameters
based on their determination of priorities. The purpose should not be to
circumvent TRIPS, because by and large it incorporates a well-honed set of
norms establishing structures of protection, 119 the impact, use, and misuse
of which have been extensively analyzed. In addition, local research and
development efforts after years of FDI have transformed China as a major
holder of domestically developed IP.
I suggest integrating TRIPS norms in a broader strategy. As with market
openness, IP rules per se are a catalyst, at best. Part of that strategy
includes accepting TRIPS as a given and perhaps, as some argue, as a
common reference/defense point against TRIPS-plus demands made in
bilateral discussions. That being said, TRIPS is not a static bundle of
norms. It evolves with each panel and appellate body interpretation. It is
also not to be read in "clinical isolation" from public international law. 120
Developing and other countries can thus coalesce to develop alternative sets
of norms 12 ' and include TRIPS and WTO rules in the broader framework of
public international law. This is not incompatible with the views stated in
UNCTAD's 2004 Trade & Development Report. 122
118. See generally William P. Alford, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual
Property Law in Chinese Civilization (1995); Okediji, supra note 29.
119. Examples of these norms include copyright (and the bundle of rights it contains,
together with exceptions and a long term of protection) for literary and artistic works and a
twenty-year patent for new, useful, and nonobvious inventions, reflected in the footnote to
Article 27 in TRIPS, supra note 9. One could, in theory, devise a different system from
scratch, but the internationalization of any such new system would have very significant
transition costs. There is no guarantee that one could do better on the basis of available
"performance indicators" for the various types of IP protection. The temptation to build sui
generis systems thus far has not been met with complete success, as the database and
computer chip examples demonstrate. That being said, the existing traditional structures of
protection are far from perfect and can be improved upon, but most likely only in an
incremental fashion. See Gervais, supra note 55.
120. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, pt. II.B, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org.
121. The recent example of the Brasilia summit between Arab and Latin American
Nations comes to mind. Additionally, see U.N. Educ., Scientific and Cultural Org.,
Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents
and Artistic Expressions, CLT/CPD/2004/CONF-201/2 (July 2004), available at
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en; The Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 49;
Ruth L. Okediji, The Institutions of Intellectual Property: New Trends in an Old Debate, 98
Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 219 (2004).
122. Trade and Development Report, supra note 116, at 79. The Report stated,
A more balanced perspective, also taking its cue from Adam Smith, links a
process of successful integration back to productivity gains from specialization,
gains that are amplified through innovation, the use of better equipment, scale
economies at the firm level and by "externalities" such as learning and
improvements in human capital.
Id. And further,
the openness agenda has perpetuated a lopsided view of the forces driving
economic integration. It stresses the potential gains from participation in
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The assumption is true that importing IP rules wholesale into the
legislative and industrial fabric of a developing economy is unlikely to
succeed. 123 However, it is fair to assume that a country's technology
imports and inward FDI are unlikely to grow without IP rules. In other
words, IP rules are required.
It would be counterproductive to develop independent rules for at least
two reasons. First, there is little if any evidence that a new form of IP or
even variations on known themes would work better. Second, there would
be huge transition costs and friction in convincing foreign partners of the
validity of such new or customized rules. For multinational corporate
investors, there is value in predictability and dealing with a known set of
regulatory parameters.
The TRIPS policy partly has the flexibility needed by developing
economies. By developing a comprehensive strategy, a country can limit
the negative impact of transitioning to higher IP protection and increase its
chances of reaping the benefits thereof, including technology-related FDI
and growing domestic internet, pharmaceutical, or other technology-based
industries.
B. Building a National Knowledge Strategy
Granted, the task at hand is not a simple one. Yet, instead of trying to
turn back the clock of extant liberalization and IP rules, this Article
suggests that they can be put to good use. This Article does not seek to
cover all aspects of a comprehensive knowledge-optimization strategy, the
primary purpose of which would be to strengthen a country's economy and
its growth. However, the following paths could be followed.
international markets while downplaying adjustment costs, and it stresses
convergence tendencies while ignoring potential sources of cumulative
divergence.... Trade is just one among several interrelated factors shaping
integration. Its impact is largely contingent on the presence of dynamic forces-
specialization, learning and innovation, scale economies and capital formation-
that do not respond in a simple or predictable way to the incentives generated from
rapid opening up. Strengthening these forces requires a series of complementary
institutional reforms and discretionary macroeconomic, industrial and social policy
measures. This implies considerable diversity in the pattern of integration, even
among countries at similar levels of economic development.
Id. at 95.
123. See, e.g., Comm'n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Executive Summary: Integrating
Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy (2002), available at
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final-report/CIPRExecSumfinal.pdf. The
Summary states that
it may be unwise to focus on TRIPS as a principal means of facilitating technology
transfer. A wider agenda needs to be pursued, as is currently being done in the
WTO. Developed countries need to give serious consideration to their policies for
encouraging technology transfer. In addition, they should promote more effective
research and cooperation with and among developing countries to strengthen their
scientific and technological capabilities.
Id. at5.
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Developing countries wishing to attract FDI and distributorships of
foreign goods, that also want to retain their best students (especially those
who have studied abroad in scientific or engineering-related fields) need an
IP policy; but, for success, that policy must form part of a broader
knowledge optimization strategy. How best to utilize foreign knowledge
and develop domestic innovation and creativity will depend in part on how
foreign investors and firms view the country's "comfort level." That
comfort level is measured in terms of IP protection and enforcement, but it
also depends on myriad other factors, including other regulatory aspects,
such as competition, investment, freedom to market, employment, and
cultural and political parameters. Indeed, the realization that IP rules per se
do not automatically lead to an increase in inward FDI, and that much more
than IP rules are required to develop domestic innovation and creativity, is
perhaps what has prompted many developing countries to insist in WTO
meetings on the technology transfer part of the TRIPS bargain, which is
enshrined in TRIPS Article 66(2), as well as capacity building under Article
67.124
The IP component of the "comfort level" perceived by U.S.-based
multinational firms as measured by Mansfield is significant, but its
importance should not be overstated. As Professor Paul J. Heald aptly
noted,
All in all, a close look at Mansfield's research provides support for the
proposition that American firms with significant disclosure worries are
influenced by the level of enforcement of trade secrecy and contract law
in making foreign direct investment decisions. Its current status as
canonical evidence that maximum enforcement of all sorts of intellectual
property law-and especially patent law-will stimulate investment
should not remain unchallenged. Instead of blindly relying on
Mansfield's research, a more rational strategy for developing countries
would take into account the costs and benefits of protection in the context
of their unique economic situation. Depending on the category of
intellectual property subject to the TRIPS Agreement, developing
countries should seriously consider minimal compliance. 12 5
Implementing TRIPS entails significant costs. 126 Not only must legal
regimes be brought into conformance, but officials working in various
government departments, including judges, police, and customs authorities,
124. See TRIPS, supra note 9, arts. 66(2), 67.
125. Heald, supra note 61, at 318.
126. See Mariko Kunimi, TRIPS Agreement, Is It Really Successful Achievement in the
WTO? The Difflcultv of Balancing Between Public and Private Interests, 3 Or. Rev. Int'l L.
46, 46 (2001). Professor Ragavan bluntly refers to this as the "poverty penalty," stating,
The term "poverty penalty" refers to the cost poorer nations suffer from fulfilling
international obligations that require prioritizing trade interests to the detriment of
welfare. Developing nations uniquely suffered the poverty penalty because, when
economic conditions and public health threatened to deteriorate, developed nations
practiced both price control and compulsory licensing.
Ragavan, supra note 46, at 779.
[Vol. 74
THE STATE OF PLA Y
must be trained to understand the new rules. Enforcement itself may
impose a serious burden on the judicial and administrative system. Many
commentators, even those in favor of high IP protection levels, recognize
that developing countries are often hit hard when first introducing TRIPS
(or a fortiori TRIPS Plus) norms, and significant costs may be incurred
relating to prosecution, examination, infringement, litigation, enforcement,
training, etc. 127 These commentators note, however, that some of these
costs may be recouped by charging user fees. 128 It is argued that a high
level of IP protection is beneficial in the long run because piracy is
detrimental to long-term domestic competitive strategies. 129 Copyright
laws are beneficial for local authors as piracy will increase their
competition by introducing foreign works at lower costs. This will inhibit
the local community from developing its work in this area in both the long
and short run.
It is also argued that patent protection is not detrimental to a country per
se. First, patents are just a series of instructions. On their own, they will
likely be useless to someone in a developing country attempting to reverse
engineer the technology. Second, patented technology from other countries
likely will not be the technology needed by a developing country.
Technology applicable to a developing country will only be developed if
there are patents in place to protect the inventor. Finally, developing
countries granting patents will pay less than wealthy countries for the use of
patent rights. 130
Properly adjusting the level of compliance with international norms, from
minimal TRIPS implementation with systematic use of all available "wiggle
room" 131 to full TRIPS Plus 132 compliance and enforcement, requires an
understanding of the fine points of a highly complex set of norms,
developed over decades of expert-level discussions, being "parachuted" into
127. See Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. Int'l Econ. L. 279, 315
& n.155 (2004); Jerome H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global
Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 11, 29 (1997)
[hereinafter Free Riders].
128. See Jean Raymond Homere, supra note 55. High user fees may make it more
difficult for lower income nationals in the country concerned to access services and may thus
indirectly benefit foreign rightsholders.
129. See Braga & Fink, supra note 64; Kitch, supra note 95, at 169-78.
130. See Kitch, supra note 95, at 169-78. See generally Braga & Fink, supra note 64.
131. See Free Riders, supra note 127, at 28.
132. On the return to bilateralism generally and TRIPS Plus negotiations by the U.S.
Trade Representative, see David Vivas-Eugui, Regional and Bilateral Agreements and a
TRIPS-Plus World: The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (2003), available at
http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/FTAA%20(A4).pdf; Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs:
Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. World Intell. Prop. 791 (2001); Ruth L. Okediji,
Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Protection, 1
U. Ottawa L. & Tech. J. 125 (2004); Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the
International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 323 (2004) (discussing the
increasing focus of the United States trade officials on bilateral, multilateral, and regional
free trade agreements).
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a legal system that may not have such checks and balances as competition
law or freedom of speech or, indeed, even the necessary level of expertise
to parse the new and highly complex rules13 3 without a comprehensive
training program.
1. Cooperation and Coalition Building.
Developing countries can, of course, coordinate. They can exchange
with each other "recipes" for success and establish coalitions and
parameters for international (bilateral, regional, or multilateral) negotiations
involving IP rules. 134  They can create regional industrial property
offices, 135 regional copyright collectives, or technical agencies offering
services to several national collectives. They also can use fora other than
the WTO in cooperation with "civil society" groups to attempt to develop
alternative norm-setting exercises. 136  The value of these exercises as
potentially relevant norms of public international law has not been fully
tested before WTO dispute-settlement panels. 137
2. Priority Setting
Based on existing industrial infrastructures, successes, education
programs, available natural and human resources, and potential domestic
and regional markets, what are the realistic areas that a country should
prioritize? The primary target of a strategy should not be to obtain new
imports, though they may be useful, but rather to build domestic IP-
generating activities. This can be done in part through FDI (which almost
always includes a knowledge and technology transfer component), but also
by developing domestic innovation, creativity, and industry at optimal
levels.138
3. Education and Institutional Capacity Building
Once priorities have been set, education and institutional capacity
building are probably the most important aspects. Education, both in the
country and abroad, is the cornerstone of a viable, long-term knowledge
133. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round I: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 21 (2004).
134. This coordination may be seen as a logical response to the coalition of industrialized
countries that successfully pushed for the adoption of TRIPS. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text; see also Ruth Okediii, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO:
Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 819, 83942 (2003).
135. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
136. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 95, 121 (2004) ("[D]eveloping
countries have recently seen regime-shifting as a bulwark against the established power
balance in international lawmaking, and over time user groups might likewise view the
ability to shift forum as a valuable defensive technique.").
137. See Gervais, supra note 12, at 343-44.
138. See Scotchmer, supra note 31, at 429-36.
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strategy and economic growth in the information society. For example, a
country should pay to send some of its best students to the top foreign
universities, especially in fields where the knowledge brought back can
directly advance the selected priorities. This could include engineering,
biology, chemistry, physics, and other sciences as well as management and
law, including IP law. In certain cases, financial mechanisms may be used
to ensure that trained graduates will return to their countries of origin.
If a country does not have patent protection, it will have difficulty
attracting technology-oriented employers and retaining nationals that have
studied in these areas. 139
A country should hold seminars and invite foreign professors and
practitioners of international standing in priority areas. Once knowledge is
available on a recurring basis domestically, more students will be able to
access it at a lower cost. Training for policy makers, judges, high officials,
and other persons involved in economic development projects should
likewise be organized. 140
Developing educational institutions and services is costly. Developing IP
institutions such as patent and trademark offices is perhaps even more so.
Yet, developing countries can either delegate these roles to foreign
institutions, a majority of which are located in the "First World," thereby
losing some of their ability to customize the services, or take the policy bull
by the horns and pay the price. Ideally, more industrialized nations should
fund training and establishment of local patent and trademark offices
because of their educational role with local businesses and research
facilities. Absent this kind of funding, another option, used in some parts of
Africa, 141 is to build regional offices.
4. Subsidies and Awards
Within WTO and other applicable rules, there is still room for several
subsidies in the form of tax breaks or other incentives. These may also be
used to attract FDI. By granting merit-based research subsidies or grants to
local creators, an incentive to local innovators and creators is created. For
example, by rewarding significant achievements at an annual award
ceremony, successful innovators and creators are compensated and a strong
social signal is sent about the value of creation and innovation. This then
functions as an additional incentive for others.
139. See Kitch, supra note 95, at 170-71; Singham, supra note 96 (arguing that patent
protection encourages invention both domestically and abroad; that weak patent systems, on
the other hand, discourage investment and cause a brain drain in countries of some of their
most talented and educated individuals; and suggesting that developing countries with
stronger protections will attract more venture capital for small start-up companies).
140. It cannot be stressed enough that successful education programs will depend on
selecting the best-qualified candidates for each program, not selecting candidates solely or
mainly on other factors which are not statistically predictive of academic success.
141. See, e.g., The African Regional Industrial Property Organization,
http://www.aripo.wipo.net/index.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2005).
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5. FDI Marketing
FDI is not a panacea, but in the game of economic growth and
development, it is a better solution than simply increasing imports. FDI
generally comes with formal or informal knowledge and technology
transfer and creates more and better local jobs than simple distributorships.
Each country should thus market its advantages bilaterally, at international
fairs, through graduate students, etc. It could survey multinational
companies operating in its priority areas to determine their perception of the
country's strengths and weaknesses, address shortcomings identified in the
survey, and provide information on positive aspects that are simply not
known in interested circles.
6. Non-IP Regulatory Adaptation
Based on WTO and other rules and surveys, regulatory shortcomings
should be addressed. Usually, an efficient legal system, investment
protections rules, a competitive tax system, and access to a qualified
workforce will rate fairly high in the list of FDI preconditions. In parallel,
as the U.K. Commission on IPRs noted, 14 2 Articles 8 and 40 of TRIPS
allows a WTO member to determine an appropriate interface between IP
and competition law. However, many countries that implemented TRIPS
recently did not, and still do not, have competition legislation. 143
7. Patent Mining
While patent mining is also not a panacea, patent databases have the
advantage of being publicly available. By mining recent patents and
providing copies to local companies with product development abilities, a
number of upward technological steps may be taken fairly rapidly. Of
course, the obligation to comply with TRIPS means that if the patent is
granted in a developing country, the technology cannot be used directly.
But even if a reasonable license cannot be obtained, the knowledge could be
used for noncommercial research, for example.
These are of course only examples of the components of a full strategy.
CONCLUSION
Without adequate IP protection, economic development will not occur at
an optimal level, though it is unclear whether IP rules have any positive
effect on the development of the truly poorer nations. In addition, we now
know that while IP is an essential ingredient, it does not, by itself, make an
economic plan. Many more elements are required. This Article has argued
that, for both practical reasons and on the basis of available empirical data,
142. See supra note 1.
143. See Dreyfuss, supra note 133, at 31-32.
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TRIPS should be seen, and accepted, as a given. Further, it may be
defended as an appropriate reference point for developing nations in the
context of TRIPS Plus bilateral trade discussions. Indeed, post-TRIPS
developments have been going in two (arguably diverging) directions. On
the one hand, TRIPS-related development within WTO, as well as recent
developments in the WIPO, have tried to be more responsive to the
perceived needs of developing countries and the interests of users in
securing access to protected content and material on terms they consider
reasonable. This even includes broad exceptions to obligations to obtain
permissions and licenses. On the other hand, IP developments in bilateral
and regional trade agreements mirror the so-called "maximalist"
approach. 144 This latter trend to regulate IP rights through bilateral regimes
may not immediately threaten the balanced approach of WTO and WIPO,
but these bilateral initiatives likely will have a significant impact in the long
run. 145
TRIPS contains a number of rules that WTO members must implement,
but it also affords a fair margin of "policy flexibility." Thus, implementing
TRIPS may and should be viewed as part of a broader knowledge strategy
resting on priority setting, education and institutional capacity-building,
regulatory adaptation, FDI "marketing," and patent mining. Finally, if
TRIPS were defended as the "correct" international norm, it would have the
effect of buttressing the position that TRIPS Plus is inadequate at this
juncture for many, and perhaps most, developing countries.
144. For example, recent U.S. Trade Agreements export the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA"), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2000)). DMCA-like provisions are--or will soon be part
of-national legislations in Central America and Asia as something of a stand-alone
legislative instrument. Similar provisions are also being negotiated in a number of other
agreements as well as within the Free Trade Area of the Americas. See Sell, supra note 10, at
121-62.
145. See Gervais, supra note 12, at 68-70.
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